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for the costs of 
discretionary determination. It considered 
Cameron Harer in this case was a 
limits and legal standards defining that 
discretion and made a reasoned decision within the scope of that discretion - that the 
State had failed to carry its burden of proof to show that the restitution award it sought 
was proper in light of all the relevant, statutorily-identified factors. Therefore, it denied 
the State's request for restitution. 
The State appealed, asserting that the district court established an additional 
for the State to prove before it merits the restitution in such cases, thereby 
excluding a particular subset of cases from the scope of the restitution statute. Since 
the district court properly exercised 
court's 
Alternatively, this 
request pursuant the 
discretion in this case, this Court should affirm 
the district court's order denying the 
of correct result, wrong reason. Since 
restitution included time prosecutor spent working on a case which 
was ultimately dismissed, and since the State failed to prove that there was an 
agreement authorizing restitution for that time, the district court had no statutory 
authority to award the restitution amount the State was requesting. Because the State 
failed to meet its prima facie burden to show it was entitled to the restitution it claimed 
under the statute, the district court order denying the State's motion was proper on this 
alternative ground. 
1 
either of this Court should district court's 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In this case, Mr. Harer pied guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver 
a controlled substance. (R., p.79.) The only term of the plea agreement expressed in 
the appellate record is the statement in Mr. Harer's guilty plea questionnaire, that the 
"State will rec[ommend] no more than retained jurisdiction." (R., p.69.) However, the 
district court subsequently indicated there was a general agreement that Mr. Harer 
would pay restitution, though "[t]here was no agreement as to ... the amount of 
restitution." (R., p.102.) Additionally, at the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor 
dismissed another case pending against Mr. Harer (CR-2014-13437). 1 (See R., p.74.) 
district court imposed a unified term of five years, with three years fixed, on 
Mr. Harer, and it retained jurisdiction over the case. (R., p.80.) Mr. Harer successfully 
completed a rider program during that period of retained jurisdiction, and the district 
court subsequently suspended his sentence for a four-year period of probation. 
(R., p.125.) 
However, at the initial sentencing hearing, the prosecutor moved for a restitution 
award of $410 dollars, $200 for the testing of substances in this case, and $210 for the 
time spent prosecuting the case. (Tr., p.3, 1-3.) Harer objected the $210 
request for the prosecutor's time. (Tr., p.3, Ls.14-16.) He argued that the request for 
restitution was not appropriate since the prosecutor's office was already properly 
1 According to the online repository, CR-2014-13437 charged Mr. Harer with possession 




investigation report (hereinafter, PSI) had also Harer was 
unemployed, and so, he "would require additional time in order to find a job to pay any 
fines, fees, court costs, or restitution that may be ordered by the Court." (PSI, p.6.)2 
The district court ordered restitution for the $200 to which Mr. Harer had not objected, 
along with $2,035.50 in other costs, fines, and fees. (Tr., p.5, L.23 - p.6, L.3; see also 
R., pp.80-81.) However, it requested briefing from the State in support of its request for 
the remaining $210. (Tr., p.6, Ls.6-11.) 
The State's brief argued that the district court had the discretion to award the 
requested restitution. (R., pp.86-92.) However, its request for restitution included an 




." (R., p.93.) 
for restitution. (R., p. 105.) 
In reaching that decision, the district court recognized: 
[I.C. § 37-2732(k)] gives the Court discretion 
is no question that 
award the costs of 
prosecution actually incurred, including the regular salaries of employees." (R., p.103.) 
However, it also noted that such an award was discretionary, not mandatory. 
(R., p.105.) Thus, it determined, "[t]he issue here is not whether the Court can award 
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"CONFIDENTAIL CLERK'S CERTIFICATE HARER 43421." Included in this file are the 
PSI report and all the documents attached thereto (police reports, addendum from rider 
staff, etc.). 
3 
of prosecution as restitution, but rather, whether it costs of 
as 1 
§ no in 
discretion in that regard, the district court looked to the general restitution statute, 
. § 19-5304, for guidance. (R., p.105.) It determined that it needed to consider '"the 
amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial 
resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other factors as the 
court deems appropriate"' in deciding whether to grant the State's request for restitution. 
(R., p.105 (quoting I.C. § 19-5304(7)).) 
In considering those factors, the district court found that "[t]he State has made no 
showing of economic loss. The deputy prosecutor's salary would have been paid 
whether or not work was done in this case." (R., p.105.) While it noted that, if the facts 
a particular case merited an award of restitution for the costs of prosecution, it would 
willing order such district court concluded the of this case did 
show such an order was merited. (R., p.105.) 
Rather, the district court explained, it had already ordered Mr. Harer to pay 
various fines, fees, and costs. (R., p.105 (identifying costs totaling $1950); compare 
R., pp.80-81 (ordering costs in the judgement of conviction totaling $2,235.50).) 
Additionally, it explained the costs for which the State was seeking restitution were "the 
hourly rate and length of time incurred by the deputy prosecutor in doing her job on this 
case." (R., p.105.) It pointed out that those were simply part of the general costs of 
maintaining the justice system and, in cases such as Mr. Harer's, those general costs 
were more appropriately borne by the government. (R., pp.105-06.) Thus, it concluded, 
4 
sees no reason as case 
no case is 
criminal case." (R., p.106.) Thus, based on its evaluation of the facts of the 
the relevant legal standards, and the State's failure to present sufficient evidence 
to justify its request, the district court denied the State's motion for that restitution. 
(R., p.106.) 
The State filed a timely appeal from that decision. (R., pp.108-10.) On appeal, it 
argued that the district court had improperly added an element of proof - that the case 
was different than the standard criminal case and thereby, improperly limited 
discretion by excluding a subset of the cases in which such restitution awards could, 




err it is 
recover of prosecution under I § 37-2732(k) only if the 
suffers "economic loss," which it does not suffer in "routine drug cases"? 
(App. Br., p.2.) 
The State's articulation of this issue is unduly narrow. Therefore, Mr. Harer 
would rephrase the issues this way: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied the State's motion 
for restitution for the costs of prosecution? 
6 
'The decision regarding whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is 
within the district court's discretion and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth 
in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7)." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599,602 (2011). While 
the restitution claim in this case was made under I.C. § 37-2732(k), "[s]ince I.C. § 37-
2732(k) is short on guidance regarding the nature of a restitution award or the 
procedure to obtain such an award, we find guidance in the general restitution statute, 
I.C. § 19-5304." State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 258 (2012). The State bears the 
burden to prove that restitution is proper, in that "the expenses were reasonable and 
necessary to treat injuries caused by the defendant's criminal conduct." State v. Card, 
1 Idaho 111, 11 5 (Ct. App. 2008). 
When the appellate courts review such exercises of discretion, they consider: 
"( 1) whether the court rightly the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
court acted within boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) 
(internal quotation omitted). The State, as the party challenging the restitution order, 
bears the burden of showing a clear abuse of the district court's discretion. Cf. 
State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805 (1996) ("Error will not be presumed on appeal, but 
must be affirmatively shown in the record. The appellant has the burden of providing an 
7 
on appeal . ."). In district court's 
if are 
1 
The District Court's Decision To Deny The State's Request For Restitution 
Constituted A Proper Exercise Of Its Discretion 
In this case, the district court properly exercised its discretion, determining that, 
when all the relevant factors were considered, the State had failed to carry its prima 
facie burden to show that the restitution it claimed was reasonable and necessary to 
address an actual loss caused by the defendant's criminal conduct (R, pp.103-06.) 
The State's attempts to transform the district court's analysis such that, as the State 
claims, the statute would "not apply[) to 'routine' drug cases" (App. Br., pp.4-6), 
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the district court's analysis. 
When the district court's decision is analyzed through the proper standard of 
it was not categorically excluding this sort of 
restitution in "routine" cases, but merely holding the State to burden of proof. Since it 
that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to show the restitution it 
claimed was necessary to address an economic loss caused by the conduct for which 
Mr. Harer was convicted in light of all the statutory factors, the district court properly 
exercised its discretion to deny that claim for restitution. As such, the State's argument 




in is no [I § 
2732(k)] gives the Court the discretion to award the costs of prosecution actually 
incurred, including regular salaries of employees." (R., p.103.) Thus, it described the 
question it was deciding as: "whether it should award costs of prosecution as 
restitution." (R., p.105 (emphasis added).) Furthermore, after examining the precedent 
upon which the State based its claim, the district court explained, "nothing in Weaver{3] 
or Cardoza[4] mandates an award for the costs of prosecution. It is a discretionary 
for the trial court." (R., p.105.) Similarly, it noted, "[i]f Legislature had wanted 
the costs of prosecution to be awarded in every drug case, the Legislature could have 
the award of costs mandatory rather than discretionary," but it had not done so. 
, p.106.) The district court's determination that this issue is within its discretion is 
regarding to restitution, and in what amount, is 
the district court's discretion." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602. 
Finally, the district court's decision demonstrated it was exercising its discretion: 
"This Court is not opposed to awarding of prosecution as restitution in appropriate 
cases and under appropriate facts and circumstances." (R., p.105 (emphasis added).) 
This also demonstrates that the district court did not, as the State contends, 
categorically exclude a certain subset of cases (the "routine" cases) from the scope of 
I.C. § 37-2732(k). (See App. Br., pp.4-6.) All the district court required is that the State 
3 State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167 (Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied. 
4 State v. Cardoza, 155 Idaho 889 (Ct. App. 2014). 
9 




its decision passes the first prong of the Hedger test for appropriate exercise 
its discretion. 
The District Court Acted Within The Outer Boundaries Of Its Discretion 
And Consistent With Legal Standards Applicable To That Decision 
The district court's determination that whether or not to award restitution is within 
its discretion also identifies the outer boundaries of its discretion, in that it could award 
the entire amount requested, or it could deny the entire request. Within those 
boundaries, the district court identified legal standards applicable to its decision: 
"Because I.C. § 37-2732(k) contains no provisions concerning the nature of a restitution 
or the proceedings to obtain that award, courts are guided by reference to the 
restitution I.C. § 19-5304." (R., 105.) The Idaho Supreme Court has 
this procedure is proper. Gomez, 153 Idaho at 258. 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(7) identifies several factors relevant to the district court's 
discretionary decision to award or not award restitution in a particular case: 
The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount of 
such restitution, shall consider [1] the amount of economic loss sustained 
by the victim as a result of the offense, [2] the financial resources, needs 
and earning ability of the defendant, and [3] such other factors as the 
court deems appropriate. The immediate inability to pay restitution by a 
defendant shall not be, in and of itself, a reason to not order restitution. 
I.C. § 19-5304(7). Additionally, restitution awards under I.C. § 19-5304 must address 
an economic loss the victim has actually suffered as the result of the conduct for which 
the defendant was actually convicted. State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 
10 
in case is s: 
or on case." 
district court as a matter of that there was no causal connection 
the loss the and the conduct had been 
convicted. (See R., p.105.) As such, the State failed to carry its prima facie burden of 
proof, and so, denying the motion was the appropriate result according to the relevant 
legal standards. 
Fundamentally though, what the district court's analysis recognized, and what the 
State's argument on appeal fails to appreciate, is that there are other factors besides 
simple fact that a loss occurred which play into the discretionary decision of whether 
to order restitution. (Compare R., pp.5-6; with App. Br., pp.4-6.) After all, "[t]he 
restitution is not so broad, however, as to authorize compensation for every 
or as a 
146 Idaho 114 (emphasis from original). Thus, as the district court 
call it to determine, within it should 
restitution. (R., p.105.) 
In ignoring this fact, State's asks this Court to reverse the district court's 
decision on appeal. (App. Br., p.7.) Granting the remedy the State requests would 
mean that district court should have granted the motion based on the evidence in 
the record. That request is improper since "[w]hen a discretionary ruling has been 
tainted by legal or factual error, we ordinarily vacate the decision and remand the matter 
for a new; error-free discretionary determination by the trial court." State v. Upton, 127 
11 
(Ct. App. 1995). The reason the requested remedy 1s 
case is it the 
in in it 
should have determined the amount of loss sustained, then ordered the defendant 
pay that amount (See App. Br., pp.4-7.) 
The Court of Appeals has already rejected such a result: "we cannot say [the 
statute] wholly disregards reasonableness and necessity as factors shaping a court's 
restitution order." In re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 283-84 (Ct. App. 2008). Since the State's 
argument in this case promotes that already-rejected perspective, in contravention of 
the plain language of the relevant statutes, this Court should reject that argument and 
uphold the full scope of the district court's discretion, as defined by the relative statutes. 
Since the district court properly recognized the outer boundaries of its discretion 
consistent with the legal standards therein, its decision satisfies the second 
of the Hedger test. 
3. The District Court's Decision Constituted An Exercise Of Reason 
The district court's discussion of this issue reveals that it gave reasoned 
consideration to each of the relevant statutory factors in its decision to deny the State's 
request for restitution. (R., pp.103-06.) For example, the district court's discussion 
about the general expenses of maintaining the judicial system is directed at the first of 
the statutory factors - the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim (here, the 
State). (See R., pp.105-06.) The point the district court was making is the claimed loss 
was relatively minor - these are just the costs which necessarily exist from having a 
justice system, not some extreme expenditure of resources. As trial counsel pointed 
12 
is h 
cases .... on 0 .... " 
1 Tr., p.4, Ls.4-5.) 
In support of that determination, the district court relied on the Supreme 
decision in State v. Hanson, 92 Idaho 665 (1968). (R., p.106.) The Hanson 
Court was evaluating the application of the since-repealed I.C. § 19-4703, which 
provided that, in any case where the defendant was convicted in a jury trial, '"the costs 
thereof shall be paid"' by the defendant. See Hanson, 92 Idaho at 668 n.1 (quoting 
§ 19-4703). The Idaho Supreme Court joined with a number of other states to hold 
that such costs "are a general expense of maintaining the system of courts and the 
administration of justice, and that such costs are more properly an ordinary burden of 
government" Id. at 668-69. 
While not a I.C. § the 
in Hanson is is 
a relatively minor amount it incurred 
in general , the 
the defendant to pay that cost is lessened. Cf State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37 
(Ct. App. 2002) (noting that I. C. § 19-5304(7) generally favors a policy of full 
of victims, and so, necessarily that cases 
that policy will not be appropriately enforced). Thus, the district court's consideration of 
that factor, as expressly required by I.C. § 19-5304(7), is not, as the State claims, 
adding an additional factor for the State to prove. (See App. Br., pp.4-6.) Rather, it is 
13 
an engaging in a reasoned examination of one 
in 
decision is an abuse of its discretion. See, e.g., State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 
881 (2011) (explaining that, even where "reasonable minds may differ as to the 
'rightness' of the district court's factual conclusions ... it is manifest that the district 
court's sentence was the product of reason," and so, the defendant had failed to show 
decision constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion). 
The district court's ultimate decision to deny the restitution request is further 
supported by its consideration of the second statutorily-identified factor - the 
defendant's financial situation. While this factor is by no means dispositive, the statute 
expressly calls for it to be considered within the totality of the district court's evaluation 
of the issue. I.C. § 19-5304(7) ("The court ... shall consider ... the financial resources, 
and earning ability of the defendant"). In this regard, the district court pointed out 
it had already ordered Mr. Harer to pay $1,950 in fines, costs, and other restitution. 
(R, p.105.) The district court did not include its order for Mr. Harer to pay $285.50 in 
statutory fees in that calculation, but with those fees added in, Mr. Harer was already 
obligated to pay $2,235.50. (See R., pp.80-81.) The PSI added that, because 
Mr. Harer was unemployed, he "would require additional time in order to find a job to 
, fees, court or restitution that may be ordered by the Court." 
(PSI, p.6.) Trial counsel effectively explained the impact of these facts in this case, 
pointing out that ordering the restitution for these particular costs of prosecution is part 
of: 
14 
they back out of the retained jurisdiction 
The prosecutor's office isn't going to miss out on another $210, but 
it may be that cutting down n the financial strain -- when they're already 
paying for costs and fees and costs of supervision and treatment and 
housing when they get back out, that this [restitution] could be the straw 
that breaks the camel's back. 
(Tr., p.3, L.21 - p.4, L.3.) Thus, the second factor identified in I.C. § 19-5304(7) weighs 
heavily against awarding the claimed restitution, particularly when, as the district court 
determined, the amount of the loss claimed was relatively minor. 
The district court's discussion of this factor echoes trial counsel's argument. For 
example, the district court adopted the assertion that it should consider not awarding the 
required restitution in light of all the other costs and fees the district court had already 
ordered. (R., p 105.) Thus, the district court's discussion of the fact that State 
would bear this cost regardless and the fact that this is just a "routine" drug case reveals 
its determination that, given his financial situation, needs, earning ability, Mr. Harer 
not be required to also bear the costs of this prosecution. (See , pp.105-06.) 
This constitutes a reasoned weighing of the relevant factors, and so, is appropriate 
within the district court's exercise of its discretion. (Compare App. Br., p.6 n.2 
(demonstrating the State's misunderstanding of the district court's analysis in this 
regard). 
Finally, the district court considered a third factor which, though not expressly 
listed in the statute, was appropriately considered under the catch-all language: "such 
other factors as the court deems appropriate." See I.C. § 19-5304(7). Specifically, that 
15 




or I § 1 
(namely, to 
sees no reason as to why this case should be treated any differently than most 
criminal cases, impliedly noting that defendants in most other criminal cases do not 
have to pay the costs of prosecution. (R., p.106.) Therefore, the district court deemed 
it appropriate to consider the limited scope of I.C. § 37-2732(k) as a factor weighing 
against ordering the relatively-minor amount of restitution requested by the State, 
particularly because the State, the party bearing the burden of proof, failed to prove why 
such an award was merited on the facts of this particular case. (R., p.105.) Rather, the 
district court found, as a matter of fact, that the State "simply provided the hourly rate 
and length of time incurred by the deputy prosecutor in doing her job on this case." 
, p.105.) Because the district court found that evidence insufficient to show the 
requested restitution should light of its consideration statutory 
factors, it properly denied the request for that restitution. 
Thus, the district court's decision demonstrates a reasoned analysis of the 
statutorily-identified factors. (See R., pp.105-06.) Therefore, its conclusion that the 
State failed to present evidence proving its claim for restitution was justified in this case, 
as well as its denial of that motion, constituted a valid exercise of its discretion. Since 
State has failed to show an abuse of the district court's discretion on appeal, this 
Court should affirm that decision. 
16 
if cou 
limited the scope of its discretion in its consideration the State's motion, this 
should still affirm its order denying the restitution award because "[w]here the 
lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the 
order on the correct theory." State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 307 (2014), reh'g denied. 
The alternative analysis is premised on the fact that the State's restitution 
request included time spent on two cases, including "CR-14-13437 (dismissed)." 
, p.93.) Since Mr. Harer was only convicted in one of those cases (see R., pp.74, 
79-84), the loss claimed is, ipso facto, not wholly attributable to the conduct for which 
Mr. Harer was convicted. That means, absent an agreement by the parties for 
Harer to pay restitution on the dismissed case, the district court lacked statutory 
to order the requested restitution. Richmond, 137 Idaho at 37 ("It is generally 
that courts criminal jurisdiction have no power or authority direct 
reparations or restitution a crime victim in the absence of a statutory provision to such 
"); see I.C. § 19-5304(9) ("The may, with the of the order 
restitution ... for economic loss or injury for crimes which are not adjudicated or are not 
before the court."). 
While the district court noted that there was a general agreement pay 
restitution, it also found, as a matter of fact, "[t]here was no agreement as to ... the 
amount of restitution." (R., p.102.) That sort of nonspecific agreement does not amount 
to an agreement under I.C. § 19-5304(9) to pay restitution for the dismissed conduct. 
17 
1 In was a general agreement to pay 
no or 
specified economic loss. They also do not express any consent by Nienburg to 
restitution that was not proximately caused by his DUI, the offense to which he 
guilty." Id. (emphasis from original omitted). Thus, the Court held that the 
agreement did not establish a valid basis for the district court to award restitution for 
losses not caused by the DUI itself. Id. As in Nienburg, the district court properly 
denied the State's request for restitution because the State failed to carry its prima facie 
burden to prove that the restitution it sought was necessary to address the conduct for 
which Mr. Harer had been convicted. See id.; Card, 146 Idaho at 114-15. 
Furthermore, this case has a more fundamental problem in regard to the 
purported agreement, which further demonstrates why this Court should affirm the 
court's order denying the restitution request on this alternative ground: the terms 
purported agreement do not actually appear in the appellate record. 
(See generally R., Tr.) As the Nienburg Court explained, the authority to order 
restitution under such agreements is governed by the plain language of the agreement. 
Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 497. Thus, without the language of the agreement, this Court 
cannot engage in the requisite analysis. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that "[e]rror will not be presumed on 
appeal, but must be affirmatively shown in the record. The appellant has the burden of 
the providing an adequate record on appeal .... " Mowrey, 128 Idaho at 805. As such, 
"where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to 
18 
,, 
V. 1 1 
a 
missing portions of the record (namely, the absent terms of the purported 
agreement to pay restitution) should be presumed to support the district court's decision 
to deny the State's restitution request That means they shouid be presumed to contain 
no specific agreement for Mr. Harer to pay restitution for the dismissed charge. 
discussed supra, absent such an agreement, the Court was without statutory 
authority to grant the State's request for restitution, since it included a claim for 
restitution for time spent on charges for which Mr. Harer was not convicted. Nienburg, 
153 Idaho at 496-97. 
In fact, since the appellate record does not reveal the terms of any relevant terms 
5 the district court's determination that there was an agreement to 
restitution at all (R., p.102) is not supported by competent and substantial 
Therefore, that determination should aside as clearly erroneous, in which 
case, there definitely was not any basis upon which the district court had authority to 
grant the State's restitution or missing part of the record should, 
Mowrey and Coma, be presumed to support the district court's decision to deny the 
State's restitution request. In either case, this Court would properly affirm the district 
court's order denying the claim for restitution. 
5 The only term of that agreement actually appearing in the appellate record is the 
statement in Mr. Harer's guilty plea questionnaire - that the State will limit its sentencing 
recommendation to allow for a period of jurisdiction (R, p.69; see generally R., Tr.) 
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this Court rules on the State's claim error in this 
on this 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Harer respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order denying 
the State's request for restitution. 
DATED this 281h day of December, 2015. 
20 
CAMERON D HARER 
147 W LINDEN AVENUE 
CHUBBUCK ID 83202 
DAVID C NYE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
DAVID R MARTINEZ 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
BRD/eas 
21 
